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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 22/07/2011

Accident number: 787

Accident time: 09:25

Accident Date: 09/09/2007

Where it occurred: AF/0308/01637,
MF0154, Gojur khel
Village, Bagram
District, Parwan
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: (29)

Date of main report: None
Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PTAB submunition

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 22/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 2

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
mechanical follow-up (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
safety distances ignored (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
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being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF DEMINING ACCIDENT OCCURRED ON ATC ON
SEPTEMBER 09, 2007
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by the Area Manager of AMAC Central (Kabul) to
investigate the demining accident involving [Victim No.1] and [Victim No.2] deminers from
ATC Good Neighbourhood Project, DT- 31. The accident occurred on 09 September 2007 at
09:25 hours in task # AF/0308/01637/MF0154 located in Gojur khel village, Bagram district of
Parwan province.
SUMMARY:
This area is part of Bagram airbase security mine belt. The area is heavily contaminated by
UXO and anti personnel mines laid by Russian forces on 1985 to protect Bagram airbase.
The team has found and destroyed 476 PMN/PMN-2 mines and 1100 different types of UXO
since commencement of clearance operations in the mentioned minefield. On 09 Sep 2007,
at 09:25, while [Victim No.1] deminer was collecting the igniters of Russian made PTAB
bomblets from a portion of the minefield, which was prepared (but not cleared) by excavator,
he stepped on a PTAB bomblets which caused it to explode. The explosion made a crater by
approx 50 cm depth and 70 cm diameter.
As a result of the explosion, [Victim No.1] lost his left leg of lower knee and received multiple
injuries on his face while the second deminer [Victim No.2] who was working 5 metres away
from the accident point received some injuries on his face. The two did not have helmets on
their heads while the accident happened.
After receiving first aid at the site the victims were shifted to Bagram Airbase American
Military Hospital. The first victim is under treatment at the hospital and the second victim
[Victim No.2] was discharged from hospital.
CONCLUSIONS:
The following points were found by investigation team:
•

The accident area and its surrounding have been prepared by the excavator with 15
cm depth. However extra soil existed there and needed to be removed from the
original ground surface but the team ignored removal of the extra soil and has
deemed it as original ground surface.

•

The relevant section leader claimed that before the accident, at 09:15 hrs he had
some quality checks in the lane where the accident happened. But as the
investigation team deployed another party for finding any evidence of the item that
caused the accident, there were three missed signals which shows poor internal QC
check of the section leader.

•

During investigation of the accident point a fragment, looked like residue of Russians
made PTAB Bomblet was found at crater of the explosion which shows that the
exploded device was Russian made PTAB bomblet.
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•

The two deminers of the party were working at the same lane with about 5 metres
distance from each other and were collecting some igniters which show direct safety
breach.

•

The two victim deminers were dressed with PPE but there helmets were not on their
heads while the accident happened.

•

The investigation team could not see all demining tools of victim deminers at the
accident site; the demining tools and PPE of the victim deminers were already shifted
to the base camp and original shape of the accident point was also changed.

•

It is the third accident that happened in this team during one year; other teams
working in this project do not have any accident during their work in this project which
shows poor command and control of the team leader.

•

The team members were not happy with their helmets and bayonets. They said that
our helmet is too heavy and the bayonet is too long and its shield is big.

•

The teams working in this project do not have mission leave while other clearance
teams are granted 10 days mission leave after each 50 working days.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
•

Refresher training is to be conducted for the team, focusing on safety precautious
and proper use of hand tools during excavation and soil removal. Internal and
External QA should be carried out on the process of refresher training.

•

On completion of the refresher training, special QA should be accomplished and
subject to satisfaction on the result of the refresher training, the team can be
deployed back to work.

•

The team command group should strictly control and make sure that all members of
the team are fully dressed with PPE/visor and at least 25 meters safety distance are
maintained between the working lanes.

•

The relevant supervisor/field officer should reinforce internal quality control visit to
make sure the team is working according to approved standards and procedures.

•

The command group should strictly control the deminers not to enter and walk into
unclear areas.

•

The team command group should ensure that all extra soils are removed from
original ground surface and consider the 13 cm clearance depth from original ground
surface.

•

The team command group is to secure the accident point and keep site and tools in
its original shape until UNMACA/AMAC investigation team arrives to the accident site.

•

The project field office is to consider the teams’ mission leave and provide opportunity
for the teams to go for mission leave after each 50 days work as other demining
teams.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 975

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor
Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Face
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg Below knee
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . . lost his left leg of lower knee and
received multiple injuries on his face".

Victim Report
Victim number: 976

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor
Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Face
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . . injuries on his face".

Analysis
The primary and secondary causes of this accident are listed as Field Control Inadequacy
because the Victims were working without wearing their visors and at a distance from each
other that was in breach of their SOPs but these errors were not corrected. Also, the field
controllers claimed to have conducted a QA check of the area, but the investigators found
metal in the area so showing that the QA check with a metal-detector had been inadequate.
Failure to supply appropriate field controls is, of course, a significant management failing.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have
been more responsible over sharing data than those internationals who presume greater
responsibility.
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